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Abstract 
This paper uses stochastic frontier analysis and Tobit regressions to provide 
international evidence on the impact of regulatory, supervision and environmental 
factors on bank efficiency.  Our contribution is twofold. First, we use a newly 
constructed database of 3,086 observations from 677 publicly quoted commercial 
banks operating in 88 countries to provide cross-country evidence on the determinants 
of banks’ cost and profit efficiency during the period 2000-2004.  Second, we utilise 
the new database of the World Bank (WB), developed by Barth et al. (2004b), to 
investigate the impact of a broad range of regulatory and supervision measures, 
including capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, private monitoring, 
official supervisory power of the authorities, and deposit insurance. Our results 
suggest a robust association of some of these measures with bank efficiency, despite 
being marginal in their impact compared to the influence of bank level capitalisation.  
We also reveal, in this context, some similarities and differences in the determinants 
of cost and profit efficiency, with plausible effects of the impact of the conditioning 
environmental factors on bank efficiency.         
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1. Introduction  
A number of studies have recently made use of available cross-country database 
constructed by Barth et al (2001a, 2004b) to provide international evidence on the 
impact of regulations and supervision of banks on their performance, stability and 
risk-taking behaviour. For example, Barth et al. (2002) examined the impact of the 
structure of bank supervision on various financial ratios. Barth et al. (2003a), 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) and Levine (2004) studied the impact of regulations on 
performance using profit, net interest margin and overhead ratios.  Furthermore, Barth 
et al. (2004a), investigate the impact of a broad range of regulation and supervision 
measures on bank stability, development and performance. Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2006) and Pasiouras et al. (2006) examine the effect of regulations on banks’ overall 
soundness, as measured by credit ratings. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and 
Beck et al. (2006a) study the impact of regulations on banking sector crisis, while 
Gonzalez (2005) and Laeven and Levine (2006) examine their impact on banks’ risk 
taking behaviour.  
We build on this strand of the literature, but study the impact of the regulatory 
environment on banks’ cost and profit efficiency, using efficient frontiers rather than 
financial ratios measuring performance1. The importance of specifying environmental 
variables while studying efficiency in the banking industry has been recognized in the 
literature (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Cavallo and Rossi, 2002; Lozano-Vivas 
et al., 2002), and most of the studies that use cross-country data account for some 
measures of the environment in which banks operate, such as market capitalization, 
GDP growth, total assets of the banking system, income per capita, etc. However, 
                                                 
1 Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Bauer et al. (1998) emphasise that efficient frontier approaches 
seem to be superior compared to the use of traditional financial ratios from accounting statements - 
such as return on assets (ROA) or the cost/revenue ratio – in terms of measuring performance. Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) also point out that the frontier approaches offer an overall objective numerical 
score and ranking, an efficiency proxy to comply with the economic optimization mechanism. 
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with regard to the regulatory aspects of the environment the empirical literature on 
bank efficiency so far has been constrained, owing to data limitations, to investigation 
of the use of simple measures such as the degree of market concentration, industry 
average capital, industry average profitability and intermediation ratios (e.g. Pastor et 
al., 1997; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Carvallo and 
Kasman, 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006). Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Weill 
(2004) and Pasiouras (2007) summarise the existing literature on cross-country 
comparisons of banking efficiency.   
Pasiouras (2007) takes the first step, to our knowledge, in extending the above 
literature by investigating the impact of a broad range of regulatory and supervision 
measures on banks’ technical efficiency, using data envelopment analysis (DEA) on a 
sample of 715 banks operating in 95 countries during 2003.  In this paper, by contrast, 
we concentrate in estimating cost and profit efficiency2 of banks using stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). The main advantage of SFA over DEA is that it allows for 
uncertainty in the estimation of efficiency scores3. Furthermore, we use panel data 
over the period 2000-2004 rather than cross-section data at one point in time (i.e. 
2003). It has been argued that efficiency is better studied and modelled with panels 
(Baltagi and Griffin, 1988; Cornwell et al., 1990; Kumbhakar, 1993; Carbo et al., 
2002), not least because the use of panel data over a cross-section provides more 
degrees of freedom in the estimation of the parameters. More importantly, the use of 
                                                 
2Cost efficiency is a wider concept than technical efficiency, since it refers to both technical and 
allocative efficiency. Profit efficiency is an even wider concept as it combines both costs and revenues 
in the measurement of efficiency. Maudos et al. (2002) argue that “Computing profit efficiency, 
therefore, constitutes a more important source of information for bank management than the partial 
vision offered by analyzing cost efficiency” (p. 34).  
3Stochastic frontiers are estimated from parametric approaches that allow us to distinguish between 
inefficiency and other stochastic shocks, and therefore can be considered superior to non-parametric 
techniques (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2006), although they are not without criticisms since they require 
a particular function form to be estimated as well as assumptions about the distribution of efficiency. 
However, studies that compare different functions and models estimated under different assumptions 
point out that the results are not significantly different (e.g. Berger and Mester, 1997; Bauer et al, 1998; 
Vander Vennet, 2002).  
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panel data accounts for time variations in efficiency given the possibility that 
managers might learn from previous experience in the production process, thereby 
indicating that inefficiency effects would change in some persistent pattern over time 
(Coelli et al., 1999).  Furthermore, there may be regulatory or environmental factors 
that affect the performance of banks over time. Thus, combining the use of SFA with 
panel data estimation, we attempt to identify the impact of the regulatory environment 
on banks’ cost and profit efficiency. Maudos and Pastor (2001) and Maudos et al. 
(2002) point out that estimation of profit efficiency and its comparison to cost 
efficiency, and international efficiency comparisons are two areas where the available 
evidence on bank efficiency is very limited. Our study contributes in filling this gap, 
while at the same time provides statistical evidence of the association of these two 
efficiency measures with the regulation and supervision approaches around the world, 
using a cross-country dataset of 677 publicly quoted commercial banks representing 
88 countries.    
We employ a two-stage estimation procedure as in Hao et al. (2001), Carbo et 
al. (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), Weill (2003), Rao (2005), Bos and Kool (2006), 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2006) among others. In the first stage, SFA is used on the 
banks’ financial information to obtain cost and profit efficiency scores. In the second 
stage, we use this information with other bank and country level data to estimate 
Tobit regressions in order to assess the impact of regulatory and environmental 
measures on efficiency.   
The broad range of regulatory variables that we use in Tobit regressions are 
obtained from the Barth (2004b) database and are related to bank regulatory and 
supervision measures such as capital adequacy requirements, private monitoring, 
official disciplinary power of the authorities, diversification restrictions on banking 
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activities, and deposit insurance schemes4. In assessing the impact of these measures, 
we control for bank size and bank capital, and check for robustness by adding country 
level environmental variables, replacing them as appropriate to account separately for 
cross-country differences in macroeconomic conditions, financial development, 
market structure, overall institutional development and access to banking services.  
The results generally indicate that there are similarities and differences in the 
impact of regulatory, supervision and environmental measures on cost and profit 
efficiency.  In particular, we find that diversification restrictions on banks’ activities 
have a negative and statistically significant impact on both cost and profit efficiency.  
Furthermore, cost, but not profit, efficiency is influenced positively by capital 
adequacy requirements, and negatively by supervision measures related to private 
monitoring (i.e. information disclosure) and the official power of the authorities.  The 
order of magnitude of these influences is small in relation to the impact of bank level 
capitalization, which contributes to cost inefficiency by about 25-35% and profit 
inefficiency by 0-2% across all our specifications.  The impact of bank size is also 
relatively small and its significance is affected by the inclusion of other environmental 
variables.  Overall, apart from deposit insurance, the impact of the regulatory related 
variables is robust to changes in the environmental conditions, some of which also 
have plausible effects on bank efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
discussion associating our study with the recent literature focussing on the impact of 
regulations in banking, as briefed in the introductory paragraph. Section 3 covers the 
methodological issues and data for our empirical work. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.     
                                                 
4 The WB database on bank regulations was originally constructed by Barth et al. (2001a) and the data 
were available from 1999. It was updated in early 2004 with data from 2003 (henceforth referred to as 
Barth et al., 2004b). 
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2. Background discussion  
The banking crises around the world over the last thirty years along with evidence that 
economic growth is related to the development of the financial sector have attracted 
the attention of policy makers on the construction of an appropriate regulatory and 
supervision framework (Levine, 1997, 2005; Barth et al. 2003a, 2004a). At an 
international level, the best known examples are the 1988 Capital Accord (or Basel I) 
and the new capital adequacy framework (Basel II) of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. While the basic element of the 1988 Capital Accord was to 
maintain a minimum capital ratio, which can account for risk-weighted assets and off-
balance sheet exposures, the new framework emphasizes two additional elements, 
supervision by the authorities (Pillar 2) and market discipline (Pillar 3).  
While many countries are in the process of upgrading their bank regulation 
and supervision approaches, this is a complex and difficult process because there is no 
clear answer on what exactly is good regulation and supervision (Demirguc-Kunt et 
al., 2006) or on how specific regulations affect the performance and stability of the 
banking sector. More precisely, Barth et al. (2004a) point out that economic theory 
provides conflicting predictions about the effect of regulations and supervisory 
practices on bank development, performance and stability, while it also makes subtle 
predictions about the precise conditions under which regulations and supervisory 
practices will achieve the desired outcomes. At the same time, only very recently have 
researchers conducted international comparisons of bank supervision and regulation 
(Barth et al., 2003b). Hence, cross-country empirical evidence is rather limited on 
which of the many different regulations and supervisory practices adopted around the 
world promote bank development and stability (Barth et al., 2004a), and we attempt to 
provide such evidence associating their effect on banking sector efficiency.   
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The traditional view of the impact of bank regulation is that higher capital 
requirements will have a positive effect on the banking sector, although the literature 
suggests that this is not always the case. Some studies indicate that capital 
requirements increase risk-taking behaviour (e.g. Koehn and Santomero, 1980; 
Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999; Calem and Rob, 1999), while others argue 
that this happens only under specific circumstances (Kendall, 1992; Beatty and Gron, 
2001; Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005). Barth et al. (2004a) find that while stringent 
capital requirements are associated with fewer non-performing loans, capital 
stringency is not robustly linked with banking sector stability, development or bank 
performance (measured with overhead and margin ratios) when controlling for other 
supervisory-regulatory policies. However, Pasiouras (2007) reports a positive 
association between technical efficiency and capital requirements, although this is not 
statistically significant in all cases.  
In theory, there tends to be support for both the official supervision approach 
and the private monitoring approach5 to bank supervision. The official supervision 
approach argues that official supervisors have the capabilities to avoid market failure 
by directly overseeing, regulating, and disciplining banks. By contrast, the private 
monitoring approach argues that powerful supervision might be related to corruption 
or other factors that impede bank operations, and regulations that promote private 
monitoring will result in better outcomes for the banking sector. While these two 
approaches of supervision might reflect different attitudes towards the role of 
government in monitoring banks, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Levine, 
2004). Consequently, in practice countries could adopt regulations that force banks to 
disclose accurate information to the public, while also create powerful official 
                                                 
5 Barth et al. (2004a) and Levine (2004) provide discussions of these two approaches. 
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supervisory agencies (Levine, 2004). Under this combined approach, a greater quality 
of information provided by a system that enhances private monitoring through 
accounting and auditing requirements might boost supervisors’ abilities to intervene 
in managerial decisions in the right way and at the right time (Fernandez and 
Gonzalez, 2005). Although Barth et al. (2004a) and Levine (2004) provide evidence 
that only private monitoring has an impact on banks’ performance, Pasiouras (2007) 
finds that official supervisory power can also influence banks’ technical efficiency.  
In addition to the regulatory approaches discussed above, which are related to 
the three pillars of Basel II, we also comment briefly on two other measures deemed 
to have an impact on banks’ cost and profit efficiency, namely restrictions on bank 
activities and deposit insurance schemes.  
Barth et al. (2004a) outline several theoretical reasons for restricting bank 
activities as well as alternative reasons for allowing banks to participate in a broad 
range of activities. For example, emphasising the argument by Boyd et al. (1998), 
they suggest that as moral hazard encourages riskier behaviour, banks will have 
opportunities to increase risk if allowed to engage in a broader range of activities. On 
the other hand, fewer regulatory restrictions permit the utilization of economies of 
scale and scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000), whilst also increase the franchise 
value of banks and result in a more sensible behaviour. Thus, while theory suggests 
ambiguous predictions, empirical evidence is relied upon.  To this end, Barth et al. 
(2004a) find a negative association between restrictions on bank activities and 
banking sector development and stability. Barth et al. (2001b) also confirm that 
greater regulatory restrictions on bank activities are associated with higher probability 
of suffering a major banking crisis, as well as lower banking sector efficiency. In 
contrast, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) find that stricter restrictions on bank 
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activities are effective at reducing banking risk, although these authors indicate that 
restrictions are only effective at controlling risk when information disclosure and 
auditing requirements are poorly developed. In particular, Gonzalez (2005) reports 
that fewer regulatory restrictions are associated with greater bank risk-taking after 
isolating (i) the effect of regulatory restrictions on bank charter value, and (ii) the 
influence of bank charter value on risk-taking.  Lower restrictions on bank activities 
have also been associated with higher credit ratings (Pasiouras et al., 2006), although 
Pasiouras (2007) finds no significant association with technical efficiency.  
 Finally, as pointed out by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), several 
countries have established a system of national deposit insurance over the last 25 
years, this being viewed in theory at least as a way of avoiding bank runs and thereby 
contributing to bank stability6. However, it can also create moral hazard problems and 
encourage excessive risk-taking behaviour, as supported by evidence from several 
studies (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Hendrickson and 
Nichols, 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002); or adversely affect the stability of 
the banking systems as a whole (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 
2004a). Pasiouras et al. (2006) find that banks operating in countries with an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme are assigned lower credit ratings. With regard to bank 
development and efficiency, Barth et al. (2004a) find no such strong association with 
deposit insurance schemes, while the results of Pasiouras (2007) are mixed.  
 
3. Methodology, Variables and Data    
3.1. Methodology  
The stochastic frontier approach (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 
1977) has been applied to several recent studies in banking (e.g. Bonin et al., 2005; 
                                                 
6For information on the design features of deposit insurance around the world, see Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005).  
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Beccalli et al., 2006; Kwan, 2006), and as already mentioned we use it in our first 
stage to estimate cost and profit efficiency of banks, treating the underlying objective 
as cost minimization or profit maximization respectively. As in Casu and Girardone 
(2004) and Beccalli et al. (2006) among others, this approach is applied to obtain the 
efficiency scores by adopting the Battese and Coelli (1992) model for panel data, with 
individual firm effects assumed to be distributed as truncated normal variables, and 
permitted to vary systematically with time.  
Starting with the specification of the cost frontier, we follow the value added 
approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992), which suggests using deposits as outputs 
since they imply the creation of value added. Hence, following Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas (2000), Maudos and Pastor (2001), Maudos et al. (2002), Cavallo and Rossi 
(2002) and others, we choose the following three outputs: loans (Q1), other earning 
assets (Q2), and total deposits (i.e. customer and interbank) (Q3). Furthermore, 
consistent with most previous studies on baking efficiency we select the following 
three input prices: cost of loanable funds (P1), calculated as the ratio of interest 
expenses to total deposits; cost of physical capital (P2), calculated by dividing the 
expenditures on plant and equipment (i.e. overhead expenses net of personnel 
expenses) by the book value of fixed assets; and cost of labour (P3), calculated by 
dividing the personnel expenses by total assets7. Using the multi-product translog 
specification8 gives our empirical cost frontier model as follows:  
                                                 
7 We use total assets rather than the number of employers due to several missing values for the later. 
Our approach is consistent with several previous studies such as Carbo et al. (2002), Maudos et al. 
(2002), Weill (2004), Carvallo and Kasman (2005), Beccalli et al. (2006).  
8Some other studies rely on the Fourier Flexible specification to estimate efficiency (e.g. DeYoung and 
Hasan, 1998; Carbo et al., 2002; Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003). Berger and Mester (1997) found that 
both the translog and the FF function form yielded essentially the same average level and dispersion of 
measure efficiency, and both ranked the individual banks in almost the same order. Vander Vennet 
(2002) also finds similar results but reports the ones obtained from the translog model. However, 
Altunbas and Chakravarty (2001) compare the FF and translog specifications and urge caution about 
the growing use of the former to investigate bank efficiency. We therefore use the tranlog specification 
as in several other recent studies such as Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) Cavallo and Rossi (2002), 
  13
∑ ∑∑∑
= == =
+++=
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
0 lnlnln2
1lnln
i j
ikti
i j
jktiktijiktikt PQQaQaTC βα  
                        ∑ ∑∑∑
− = ==
++++
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
lnlnlnln
2
1
i i j
ktktjktiktij
j
jktiktij uvPQPP γβ     (1) 
 
where TCkt is total cost (i.e. interest expenses plus non-interest expenses) of bank k in 
period t (t=1, 2, …, T); Qikt corresponds to the output i (Qi, i=1, …., 3) of bank k in 
period t; Pikt represents the input price (Pi) for input factor i (i=1, …., 3) of bank k in 
period t; vkt are random errors assumed to be iid and N(0,σv2); ukt being non-negative 
random variables accounting for cost inefficiency and assumed to be iid with 
truncations at zero on the N(µ,σu2) distribution, and ukt = (ukexp(-η(t-T))), where η is 
an unknown scalar parameter; and αi,αij, βi, βij γij are the parameters to be estimated.  
 In the case of the profit frontier model, the variable to be explained is the 
profit before taxes (PBT). In principle, the selection of output price variables in the 
profit function would depend on whether we assume the existence of market power in 
the setting of output price or not (Berger and Mester, 1997). The standard profit 
frontier approach assumes the existence of perfect competition in the markets for 
outputs and inputs, and requires information on the prices of the output vector, which 
in most cases is not available. Hence, most of the empirical studies estimate an 
alternative profit frontier, which assumes that due to imperfect competition banks take 
as given the quantity of output and the price of inputs and maximise profits by 
adjusting the price of the output and the quantity of inputs. Hence, this approach does 
not require output price data for the estimation of the profit frontier. Consequently, 
the specification of the profit frontier model is the same as that of the cost frontier 
                                                                                                                                            
Bonin et al. (2005), Bos and Kolari (2005), Carvallo and Kasman (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), Bos 
and Kool (2006).  
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(equation (1)) with PBTkt replacing TCkt as the dependent variable. However, the sign 
of the inefficiency term now becomes negative (-ukt).  
 We also impose linear homogeneity restrictions by normalizing the dependent 
variable and all input prices by the third input price P3. Hence, without loss of 
generality we subtract the logarithm of the cost of labour from both sides of the cost 
and profit models. Additionally, since a number of banks in the sample exhibit 
negative profits, the dependent variable in the profit model is transformed to 
( )( )1//ln min33 ++ PPBTPPBT , where min3 )/( PPBT  is the minimum absolute value 
of )/( 3PPBT  over all banks in the sample. This transformation is necessary to 
estimate the profit frontier without excluding all banks with negative profits from the 
sample9.    
All bank-specific data for the estimation of the efficient frontiers were directly 
converted to US dollars, in Bankscope, prior to downloading. Furthermore, as in 
Altunbas et al. (2001), Casu and Molyneux (2003), and Hauner (2005) among others, 
we expressed the data in real 1995 terms using individual country GDP deflators. 
Table 1 presents the mean of the variables discussed above by year (Panel A) and 
geographical region (Panel B)10.  
[Insert Table 1 Around Here] 
 
The parameters of the stochastic frontier models are estimated using maximum 
likelihood11. The individual bank (in)efficiency scores are calculated from the 
estimated frontiers as CEkt= exp(ui) and PEFkt = exp(-ui), the former taking a value 
                                                 
9 So that the dependent variable is ( ) 01ln = for the bank with lowest PBT, and positive for all other 
banks. 
10 In assigning countries in regions we follow the classification of Global Market Information Database 
(GMID) of Euromonitor International.  
11 See Battese and Coelli (1992), Coelli (1996), and Coelli et al. (1999) for further details.  
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between one and infinity and the latter between zero and one12. To make our results 
comparable, therefore, we calculate the index of cost efficiency as follows:        
CEFkt= 1/ CEkt. Hence, in both cases the efficiency scores will be between 0 and 1 
with values closer to 1 indicating a higher level of efficiency.  
   
3.2. Explanatory variables in Tobit Regressions  
In testing the impact of the regulatory environment on bank efficiency, we control for 
other country-specific and bank-specific characteristics well known in the literature. 
Our second stage in the analysis therefore involves use of Tobit regressions with the 
dependent variable as the cost or profit efficiency score, regressed on empirical 
proxies for the regulatory factors discussed in section 2 and other control variables.  
This allows for identification of the regulatory variables that are significant on bank 
efficiency, conditional on other bank specific factors, as well as market environment 
and economic conditions. The rest of this sub-section briefly outlines the set of 
regulatory and appropriate control variables used, while Appendix A provides further 
details on their calculations and sources of information.  
 
3.2.1 Regulations and supervision related variables  
We construct these variables from information available in the Barth (2004b) database 
to represent the key aspects of regulation and supervision framework, namely capital 
adequacy, private monitoring, official supervision, diversification restrictions and 
deposit insurance.  
CAPRQ is an index of capital requirements, accounting for both initial and 
overall capital stringency. The former indicates whether the source of funds counted 
as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities and 
                                                 
12 In both cases, values closer to one indicate higher efficiency.  
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borrowed funds, as well as whether these sources are verified by the regulatory or 
supervisory authorities. The latter indicates whether risk elements and value losses are 
considered while calculating the regulatory capital. CAPRQ is calculated on the basis 
of nine questions and can therefore range between 0 and 9, with higher values 
indicating higher capital stringency.  
PRMONIT is an index of private monitoring. The index is constructed by 
adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise to ten questions that indicate the degree 
of information that is released to officials and the public, auditing related 
requirements and whether credit ratings are required. PRMONIT can take values 
between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating more private oversight.  
OFPR indicates the ability of supervisors to exercise their power and get 
involved in banking decisions. It is calculated on the basis of 10 questions relating to 
supervisory power in terms of prompt corrective action, declaring insolvency, and 
restructuring. Theoretically, it can take values between 0 and 10, with higher values 
indicating more power.  
ACTRS is a proxy for the restrictions on the activities that banks can 
undertake. This variable is determined on the basis of whether securities, insurance 
and real estate activities are unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited, as well as 
whether banks can own non-financial firms. Depending on the answer, the level of 
restrictions in each activity is quantified between 1 (unrestricted) and 4 (prohibited). 
We then construct an overall index by calculating the average value of restrictions 
over the four activities, with higher values of ACTRS indicating more restrictions.  
Finally, DEPINS is a dummy variable indicating whether the country has an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme or not.  
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3.2.2 Control variables  
We use the logarithm of total assets (SIZE) and the equity to assets ratio (EQAS) to 
control for bank size and capitalization. However, we do not control for other bank-
specific characteristics such as loans to assets or deposits to assets ratios, as these 
elements (i.e. deposits, loans) were considered during the estimation of the efficiency 
frontiers. Their inclusion in the second stage of the analysis could therefore lead to 
potential endogeneity bias that is difficult to be deal with in Tobit regressions.  
In addition, we draw upon the relevant literature to select appropriate control 
variables in accounting for differences in various country level characteristics.  
Annual GDP growth (GRDGR) and annual inflation (INF) are commonly used 
measures to control for the country-specific macroeconomic environment (Grigorian 
and Manole, 2002; Maudos et al., 2002; Hauner, 2005; Pastor and Serrano, 2005; 
Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Pasiouras, 2007).  
To control for financial sector development across countries, we incorporate 
the following measures: (i) ASSGDP is a measure of size of the banking system, 
calculated by dividing the assets of deposit money banks with GDP, (ii) CLAIMS is 
an indicator of activity in the banking sector and is the ratio of bank claims to the 
private sector to GDP, and (iii) MACGDP is a measure of size of the stock market, 
calculated as the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP13. Same or similar 
measures have been used in other studies (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000, 
Barth et al., 2003a, 2004a, Kasman and Yildirim, 2006, Pasiouras, 2007). 
Also, following previous studies that focus on banks’ performance (Claessens 
et al., 2001; Barth et al., 2002, 2004a; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Fries and Taci, 
2005; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; Pasiouras et al., 
                                                 
13 Further discussion can be found in Beck et al. (2000).    
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2006; Pasiouras, 2007), we control for cross-country differences in the national 
structure and competitive conditions of the banking sector, using the following 
measures: (i) FOREIGN is the percentage of foreign-owned banks operating in the 
market; (ii) GOVERN is the percentage government-owned banks operating in the 
market; and (iii) CONC is the percentage of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks relative to the total assets of the commercial banking sector within 
the country.  
Furthermore, we follow La Porta et al. (1998), Levine (1998) and others who 
have studied the effects of different legal environments on the financial system, and 
control for differences in the institutional environment using: (i) PRIGHT as an 
indicator of the protection of property rights, and (ii) GOVINT as an indicator of 
government intervention in the economy.  Barth et al. (2004a) find that better 
developed private property rights and greater political openness mitigate the negative 
association of moral hazard and bank fragility. Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) report 
that banks in a poor legal system with improper enforcement of rules carry a higher 
risk.  Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) report a negative impact of property rights 
protection on bank margins, whereas Pasiouras (2007) finds a positive effect on 
technical efficiency.   
Finally, following Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Maudos et al. (2002), 
Pastor and Serrano (2005) and Pasiouras (2007), we control for access to banking 
services using: (i) BRAKM which corresponds to the number of branches per 1,000 
sq km, and (ii) ATMKM which corresponds to the number of ATMs per 1,000 sq km.  
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3.3. Data and summary statistics 
Our final sample consists of 677 publicly quoted commercial banks14, operating in 88 
countries, for which data for at least one year are available between 2000 and 2004. 
This sample was determined as follows. We started by considering all the publicly 
quoted commercial banks in the Bankscope database, giving a total of 1,008 banks 
from 113 countries. We then excluded 72 banks from 15 countries (i.e. Bahamas, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Bermuda, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Malawi, 
Monaco, Nepal, Palestinian Territory, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia) not included in 
the Barth et al. (2004b) database. We further excluded 28 bank-year observations that 
corresponded to 15 banks operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, and Serbia 
and Montenegro, for which GDP deflators where not available in the Global Market 
Information Database (GMID) of Euromonitor International. Finally, we excluded 
any bank-year observation, for which at least one of the dependent or explanatory 
bank-specific variables was zero or missing. This resulted in an unbalanced dataset of 
3,086 bank-year observations. Table 2 presents the observations by year and 
geographical region.  
[Insert Table 2 Around Here] 
 
During the above procedure, we selected unconsolidated data where available, 
but otherwise relied on consolidated data. Specifically, where both unconsolidated 
and consolidated reports were available, but missing values were observed in the 
unconsolidated reports, we used consolidated data. Furthermore, where possible, we 
used reports prepared under the international accounting standards (IAS), or relied on 
                                                 
14 We focus on publicly quoted banks because, as mentioned in Laeven and Levine (2006), it enhances 
comparability across countries. Furthermore, it allows us to examine a more homogenous sample in 
terms of services, and consequently inputs and outputs, enhancing further the comparability across 
countries. Finally, it is more appropriate to use the sample for this type of banks since, as mentioned in 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), the regulatory data of the Barth et al. (2004b) are for commercial banks. 
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those prepared under the local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
where these were available instead. In particular, where IAS data were only available 
for one or two years while GAAP data were available for more years, we used the 
latter ones.  
As shown in Appendix A, data for country-specific variables were collected 
from the WB databases, GMID and the Heritage Foundation. Specifically, data for the 
regulatory and supervisory variables (CAPRQ, PRMONIT, OFPR, ACTRS, DEPINS) 
and two market structure variables (FOREIGN, GOVERN) were obtained from Barth 
et al. (2004b), for indicators of access to banking services (BRAKM, ATMKM) from 
Beck et al. (2005), and for CONC from the updated version of the WB database on 
financial development and structure (Beck et al., 2006b), initially constructed by Beck 
et al. (2000). Data for the indicators of macroeconomic (GDPGR, INF) and financial 
development (ASGDP, CLAIMS, MACGDP) were obtained from GMID, and for the 
overall institutional environment (PRIGHT, GOVINT) from the Heritage Foundation. 
Table 3 presents the sample means of the independent variables by geographical 
region. 
[Insert Table 3 Around Here] 
4. Results 
4.1 Stage 1- SFA results 
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates of the cost and profit frontier models15. The negative 
value of η in the cost function indicates a decreasing trend in cost efficiency, the 
opposite being the case for profit efficiency. This seemingly anomalous result in fact 
suggests that banks operate at higher cost in order to achieve a higher level of 
profitability.      
                                                 
15These were obtained using the Frontier 4.1 computer program discussed in Coelli (1996).  
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[Insert Tables 4 and 5 Around Here] 
 
As shown in Table 5, the full sample overall mean profit efficiency score 
(PEF) equals 0.9402, while that of cost efficiency (CEF) is 0.8499, and the table also 
provides information about the level of banking efficiency by year (Panel A) and 
region (Panel B). As expected from the sign of η discussed above, the results confirm 
that over the period of estimation, banks have become more profit efficient albeit less 
cost efficient. More specifically, PEF increases each successive year from 0.9235 in 
2000 to 0.9548 in 2004, while CEF declines over the corresponding period from 
0.8568 to 0.8448. Of the seven regions, Australia has the most profit efficient banking 
system (with PEF equal to 0.9495), followed by Eastern Europe (0.9481), while North 
America (0.9378) and Western Europe (0.9373) show the lowest scores. However, the 
latter two are the most cost efficient banking systems with CEF scores of 0.9329 and 
0.8910 respectively. By contrast, the less cost efficient banking sectors are those of 
Latin America and Caribbean (0.7855) and Eastern Europe (0.8068). Hence, as in 
previous studies, we observe that the most cost efficient banks are not necessarily the 
most profit efficient banks and visa versa,16 and our findings confirm this anomalous 
trend for the time period 2000-2004. Consequently, we support the argument of 
Guevara and Maudos (2002) that the analysis of cost efficiency offers only a partial 
view of banks’ efficiency and it is therefore important to analyze profit efficiency as 
well.     
 
                                                 
16Casu and Girardone (2004) report that over the period 1996-1999 the most cost efficient banking 
groups in Italy seem to be also the least profitable. Guevara and Maudos (2002) examine cost and 
profit efficiency in EU-15, and indicate that the “other bank institutions” group is the most efficient in 
terms of costs but the most inefficient in terms of profits. Berger and Mester (1997) also show that 
profit efficiency is not positively correlated with cost efficiency.   
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4.2. Stage 2- Tobit regression results  
In the second stage, as already mentioned, we investigate the determinants of bank 
efficiency by estimating Tobit regressions using the efficiency scores CEF and PEF as 
the dependent variables. Since these scores range between 0 and 1, Tobit regressions17 
are more appropriate than OLS.  
We estimate several specifications of the Tobit model, while controlling for 
two bank-specific attributes and various country characteristics discussed in Section 
3. For each specification, our approach to estimation involves first examining the 
impact of individual regulatory related variables on the efficiency scores (columns 1-
5). However, since Barth et al. (2004a) and Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) among 
others indicate that many regulations can be substitutes or complements and countries 
will probably not select these policies in isolation, we also estimate a specification 
that includes all the policy variables (column 6). However, we do not simultaneously 
include all the control variables for two reasons. First, such an approach would 
considerably reduce the degrees of freedom and presumably affect the significance of 
the estimates18. Second, including many regressors increases the potential for 
multicollinearity.  
The regression results obtained with different sets of control variables are 
presented in Tables 6 to 11.  In each table, Panel A shows the estimates for cost 
efficiency and Panel B the same for profit efficiency. Depending on data availability, 
the estimation sample ranges between 2,366 and 3,08219 observations. Since use of 
estimated scores as dependent variables in a two-stage process can render 
                                                 
17Tobit regressions were performed in E-Views 5.1.  
18 Simultaneously considering all variables would significantly decrease the number of available 
observations due to different missing observations for different countries.  
19In this second stage, we also excluded from the sample the bank with the lowest PBT/P3. This bank 
had an efficiency score (i.e. dependent variable) considerably lower than all the other scores in the 
sample, and this outlier could potentially bias the regression estimates.  
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heteroskedasticity (Saxonhouse, 1976), we follow Hauner (2005) and Pasiouras 
(2006, 2007) in reporting QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates.   
 
[Insert Table 6 Around Here] 
 
Table 6 shows the estimated results after controlling for bank size (SIZE) and 
capitalization (EQAS), with no other conditioning variables. We find that higher size 
results in higher cost efficiency in most of the specifications, but not in higher profit 
efficiency. In contrast, EQAS has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
both CEF and PEF, its effect more dominant on the former. The coefficient values on 
this term indicate that EQAS affects CEF by roughly 30% and PEF by 1.5% (Column 
6).  Although this result contradicts some previous studies20, it is consistent with 
Allen and Rai (1996) who report that higher stockholders’ equity (relative to total 
assets) increases inefficiency for small universal banks and large banks in countries 
that prohibit functional integration of commercial and investment banking.  
Similarly, Cavallo and Rossi (2002) report a positive and significant 
relationship between capitalization and cost inefficiency for Germany and Italy. One 
potential explanation is that more skilful managers can generate profits and achieve 
efficient use of inputs while operating with higher leverage. Another explanation, 
potentially related to moral hazard theory, is that banks with lower capital levels may 
increase their risk-taking. Hence, by investing in more risky but potentially more 
profitable activities, these banks may turn out to be more efficient in the short term, 
although they will probably pay the consequences of their risky behaviour in the long 
term. Furthermore, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) mention that under the 
                                                 
20 Some of the studies that report a positive relationship between equity to assets ratios and efficiency 
in the second stage of the analysis have also used equity during the estimation of efficiency in the first 
stage. Hence, the results might have been biased due to endogeneity problems.  
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efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms tend to choose relatively low equity 
ratios, as higher expected returns from greater profit efficiency substitutes to some 
degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against financial distress. In their 
extended US banks’ study investigating the relationship between profit efficiency and 
capital structure, they find that lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher 
profit efficiency, an effect that is economically and statistically significant.  However, 
while interpreting our results, it should be kept in mind that our sample consists of 
only publicly quoted banks, which are typically the larger ones in a given country. 
This might be a critical factor in the negative effect of EQAS, since McAllister and 
McManus (1993) and Demsetz and Strahan (1997) also find evidence to suggest that 
large banks tend to use their advantage in the diversification process to increase risky 
lending and to operate with lower capital ratios, rather than at lower levels of risk.  
Turning to the impact of the regulatory variables, we observe one similarity 
but otherwise significant differences in the results between cost and profit efficiency. 
More precisely, only ACTRS has a statistically significant impact on both CEF and 
PEF. The negative sign of its coefficient indicates that higher (lower) restrictions on 
the activities than banks undertake reduce (increase) bank efficiency. This is 
consistent with the view that less regulatory control allows banks to engage in various 
activities which result in exploitation of economies of scale and scope and generate 
income from several sources, thus increasing both cost and profit efficiency.  
The other regulatory variables have a statistically significant impact only on 
CEF. The effect of CAPRQ is positive indicating that more stringent regulations 
related to capitalization result in higher cost efficiency. While one may expect the 
effect of CAPRQ and EQAS to be of the same sign, this is not necessarily so for two 
reasons. First, the construction of CAPRQ is mostly related to the way the capital 
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ratios are calculated rather than to their absolute values (Appendix A). Second, while 
capital adequacy requirements refer to risk-weighted ratios, we have used the equity 
to assets ratio as a measure of capitalization (EQAS) as in most previous studies21.  
We also find that the existence of a deposit insurance scheme (DEPINS) has a 
positive influence on cost efficiency, but this is statistically significant only when 
included with the other regulatory variables. To some extent this result is consistent 
with previous studies examining the performance, stability, and risk-taking in the 
banking industry, which indicate that the impact of deposit insurance depends on 
other regulations and the overall environment in which banks operate (Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2004a; Pasiouras et al., 2006).      
As with ACTRS, the effect of PRMONIT is negative, as expected, suggesting 
that higher requirements related to private monitoring reduce cost efficiency. This 
effect might be associated to higher costs required to meet increased disclosure 
requirements, such as consolidated accounts, disclosure of off-balance sheet items to 
supervisors and to the public, disclosure of risk management procedures to the public, 
auditing by certified auditors, as well as further expenses to obtain credit ratings from 
external agencies. Alternatively, it could be associated to possible differences between 
reported figures and actual costs. Assuming that banks in less developed accounting 
and auditing environments have more incentives to hide part of their expenditures for 
tax reasons, it is plausible that higher requirement of private monitoring could present 
higher cost efficiency.  
                                                 
21Data unavailability or many missing values in Bankscope precluded the use of risk-weighted ratios 
such as Tier 1 ratio or total capital ratio.  According to Valkanov and Kleimeir (2007), the use of risk-
weighted ratios might imply different results, in contrast to the ones we obtained with the equity to 
assets ratio.   They mention that the denominator of regulatory ratios consists of risk-weighted assets, 
rather than average total assets. Consequently, more risk-averse banks having their portfolios invested 
in less risky assets, will have lower risk-adjusted assets and, consequently, higher regulatory capital 
ratios than an otherwise similar but less risk-averse banks. In addition, the more risk-averse a bank is, 
the higher its risk-based capital ratios will be relative to its equity-to-assets ratio. While examining 
acquisitions they argue that this can explain why target banks have, on average, higher regulatory 
capital ratios but at the same time lower equity capitalization rates than other institutions. 
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Similarly, the impact of OFPR is negative and statistically significant on CEF. 
Hence, as in Levine (2004), we find that official supervisory power of the authorities 
exerts a negative influence on the functioning of banks. Barth et al. (2003b) also 
indicate that official government power is particularly harmful to bank development 
in countries with closed political systems. That higher supervisory power increases 
cost inefficiency, as in our case, is also consistent with the view that powerful 
supervisors may use their power to induce banks to lend politically-connected firms 
on advantageous terms22.    
[Insert Table 7 Around Here] 
 
The next sets of results attempt to check for robustness by re-estimating the 
model with additional variables to control for the specific environment. The results in 
Table 7 show that controlling for the macroeconomic environment (using GDPR and 
INF) does not significantly change the impact of the regulatory variables on CEF and 
PEF. In addition, the influence of EQAS remains significant and negatively related to 
both CEF and PEF. However, with respect to the impact of SIZE the results are now 
mixed, this effect being displaced partly by the impact of inflation (INF). In other 
words, higher inflation has a more significant influence on increasing costs and 
reducing profits, implying lower cost and profit efficiency, as found by Kasman and 
Yildirim (2006). In addition, GDPGR has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on PEF. Hence, as in Maudos et al. (2002) we find that banks operating in expanding 
markets present higher levels of profit efficiency. Furthermore, Maudos et al. (2002) 
                                                 
22As Barth et al. (2004a) summarize powerful supervisors may use their power to benefit favored 
constituents, attract camain donations and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 
2002; Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). Both Barth et al. (2004a) and Levine (2004) report positive and 
statistically significant relationships between corruption and official supervisory power using 
international datasets.  
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report that under expansive demand conditions, banks feel less pressured to control 
their expenses and become less cost efficient. However, although we find a negative 
impact of GDPGR on CEF, this is statistically significant in only one of the six 
specifications (Panel A).   
[Insert Table 8 Around Here] 
 
Controlling for the development of the financial sector makes the effect of 
DEPINS individually significant on CEF, but otherwise does not significantly alter 
the impact of the other regulatory variables (Table 8). However, of the three variables 
chosen to control for financial sector development, only stock market capitalisation 
(MACGDP) has a significant impact on both CEF and PEF (in the latter case 
displacing the significance of EQAS in some specifications).  Kasman and Yildirim 
(2006) also find that both cost and profit efficiency increases as market capitalization 
increases, while Pasiouras (2007) confirms the same for technical efficiency. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) also find a positive relationship between stock 
market capitalization and net interest margin, attributing it to a complementarity effect 
between debt and equity financing. Furthermore, Barth et al. (2003a) report a positive 
and significant relationship between stock market capitalization and return on assets 
in half of their specifications. These findings support the view that, as stock markets 
develop, improved information availability increases the potential pool of borrowers, 
making it easier for banks to identify and monitor them, which can obviously have a 
positive impact on both cost and profit efficiency.  Appropriately we also find a 
significantly positive impact of the level of activity in the banking sector (CLAIMS) 
on CEF, although its effect on PEF is negative (but insignificant).  We also find a 
marginally negative impact of the size of the banking sector (ASSGDP) on CEF, 
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although this is only statistically significant in the presence of the other conditioning 
variables.   
[Insert Table 9 Around Here] 
 
Table 9 reports the results after including the three market structure indicators 
(GOVERN, FOREIGN and CONC). In this case, with regard to the bank-specific and 
regulatory variables, the results are consistent with those obtained earlier (Table 6), 
with CAPRQ now having a significant impact on both cost and profit efficiency. 
However, all three control variables have opposite effects on CEF and PEF.  But the 
effects differ in terms of magnitude and significance.  The significance of GOVERN 
on both implies that a higher share of government owned banks contributes to higher 
CEF, but results in lower PEF (and its effect here is very marginal). In a sense, the 
positive effect on CEF is consistent with the view that government-owned banks 
contribute to economic development and improvement of welfare (Stiglitz, 1994), 
whereas the opposite effect on PEF can be associated with the claim that government 
ownership can have negative consequences for the financial and banking sectors 
(Barth et al., 2001b; La Porta et al., 2002). The negative and significant impact of the 
presence of foreign banks in the market (FOREIGN) on cost efficiency is consistent 
with Ataullah and Le (2006).23  We also find some evidence (although very limited 
and marginal in this case) to support the opposite view that a higher proportion of 
foreign banks has a positive impact on the banking sector, consistent with prior 
studies that report a positive association with profitability (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999; Barth et al., 2002, 2003a) and credit ratings (Pasiouras et al., 2006). 
Also, higher concentration (CONC) results in higher cost efficiency, as in Ataullah 
                                                 
23Our sample includes banks from several less developed countries, where the recent and rapid entry of 
foreign banks has led to an increase in costs of domestic banks in the short-run in order to set up 
advanced information systems and risk management practices introduced by foreign banks. 
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and Le (2006) and others. This effect is quite significant relative to the effects of 
GOVERN and FOREIGN and suggests that larger banks operating in more 
competitive markets (with foreign and state banks) are under increased pressure to 
control their costs. However, this does not translate into higher or lower profit 
efficiency, since the effect of CONC on PEF is insignificant. 
 
[Insert Table 10 Around Here] 
     
Controlling for institutional development within each country (using PRIGHT 
and GOVINT - Table 10) we find that the results for CEF are robust and, as in Table 
9, CAPRQ has a positive and significant on PEF when considered in conjunction with 
the other regulatory variables (column 6). However, the significance of OFPR is now 
displaced, although on its own remains significant in influencing PEF (column 3). The 
most significant change in the results for PEF is the positive and statistically 
significant impact of bank SIZE, associated mainly with the impact of the property 
rights variable (PRIGHT). In turn, this contributes to the insignificance of OFPR, but 
at the same time we uncover a positive and statistically significant effect of DEPINS 
on PEF.   In Table 8, we controlled for financial sector development and observed a 
statistically significant (and negative) effect of DEPINS on CEF.  Here, the impact of 
DEPINS on CEF is insignificant (although remains negative), this being displaced by 
the inclusion of the environmental variables, both of which are significant on CEF.  
Together, these results indicate that deposit insurance has a discernible effect on bank 
cost or profit efficiency, but the effect seems to depend on financial sector and 
institutional development.  As regards the impact of PRIGHT, this is positive on CEF 
but negative on PEF.  This seemingly anomalous result may be due to factors such as 
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country laws that protect private property, and court systems that enforce contracts, 
which contribute to cost efficiency, but otherwise the reduction in profit efficiency 
may be due to high levels of corruption and expropriation in developing countries. 
However, the positive effect of PRIGHT on CEF is consistent with that found by 
Pasiouras (2007) on technical efficiency, and the negative impact on profit efficiency 
is consistent with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004). Another way of 
explaining the opposite effects may be the due to the degree to which banks can 
increase the gap between what they pay savers (i.e. minimizing cost inefficiency) and 
what they receive from borrowers (maximizing profit efficiency), which is dependent 
upon the state of the economy or the institutional environment. Furthermore, banks’ 
risk taking capabilities can potentially vary with the institutional environment24. 
 
[Insert Table 11 Around Here] 
 
Table 11 shows the results of our regressions while conditioning for access to 
the banking system through branch services and ATMs. It should be noted that the 
sample in this case has been reduced by approximately 700 banks observations owing 
to the absence of data on ATMKM and BRAKM for several countries, and therefore 
comparisons with previous results need to be treated with caution. However, despite 
the smaller sample, we observe only minor differences in the results for CEF (Panel 
A) such as the insignificant impact of SIZE in most specifications, but otherwise the 
results are robust with ATMKM and BRAKM being statistically significant.  The sign 
of these coefficients indicates that, contrary to expectations, cost efficiency rises as 
the number of branches per 1,000 square km increases and falls with the increase in 
                                                 
24 Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) report that banks in a poor legal system with improper enforcement 
of rules carry a higher risk. 
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ATMs.  However, the magnitude of these effects is very small and the effects are not 
robust to alternative specifications25.  None of these two effects are significant on PEF 
(Panel B)26, and so the results in this case resemble those of Table 6 indicating that 
profit efficiency is driven mainly by EQAS and ACTRS in the absence of other 
significant environmental factors.   
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper takes a step forward in extending the literature on bank efficiency by 
providing empirical evidence on the association between cost and profit efficiency 
and regulation and supervisory approaches around the world. In investigating this 
association, we used a panel dataset of 3,086 financial observations covering the 
period 2000-2004, comprising 677 publicly listed commercial banks operating in 88 
countries. We used this data, available in Bankscope, along with country level data on 
bank regulatory, supervision and other environmental measures, obtained from other 
sources (Appendix A). We employed stochastic frontier analysis on bank financial 
information to estimate cost and profit efficiency, and then performed Tobit 
regressions to investigate the impact on these measures of regulations related to 
capital adequacy, private monitoring, disciplinary power of the authorities, restrictions 
on banks’ activities, and deposit insurance, subject to changes in the environmental 
conditions to account for macroeconomic factors, financial development, market 
structure, overall institutional development, and access to banking services.  
                                                 
25 We estimated alternative specifications, with ATMKM and BRAKM entered individually, and found 
that BRAKM remained statistically significant and positively related to CEF, but the effect  of 
ATMKM became positive and significant on CEF in some specifications. In any case, the magnitude 
and hence the economic significance of these coefficients remains very marginal.  We also replaced 
ATMKM and BRAKM by the ratio of BRAKM/ATMKM, and obtained some inconsistent results.  For 
example, BRAKM/ATKM was positive and statistically significant in specifications 2, 4 and 5 (only at 
the 10% level at the case of the later 2) but negative and statistically significant in specifications 3 and 
6.  Hence, we conclude that the effects of these variables are not robust. 
26In this case, both variables were insignificant in alternative specifications too, and no statistically 
significant association was found between BRAKM/ATMKM and PEF.  
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The empirical results show a robust association of some of the regulatory and 
environmental measures with cost efficiency, and to a limited extent with profit 
efficiency, after accounting for bank size and capitalization as bank-specific control 
factors. In this context, our results reveal some similarities and differences in the 
determinants of cost and profit efficiency.  In most specifications, cost efficiency is 
influenced by regulations related to capital requirements, private monitoring (i.e. 
information disclosure), official power of the authorities, and restrictions on banking 
activities. However, profit efficiency is affected only by restrictions on the activities 
that banks can undertake.  The impact of these measures is marginal compared to the 
influence of bank level capitalization, but is invariant to robustness checks conducted 
by changing the conditioning environmental variables. 
Our results also indicate that the significance of some regulatory measures is 
governed by the conditioning variables.  For example, capital adequacy requirements 
improve profit efficiency in market environments where the effect of government 
ownership of banks is also significant.  Similarly, the impact of deposit insurance on 
banks efficiency depends on the financial and institutional development of the 
countries.  Similarly, the impact of bank size on cost efficiency is either positive or 
negative, depending on the state of the economy.  The impact of bank size on profit 
efficiency is found to be positive and statistically significant only with better 
protection of property rights.   
We also find that some of the conditioning variables have plausible effects on the two 
measures of efficiency, in some cases similar and in others opposite.  In particular, 
financial development (specifically stock market capitalization) aids both cost and 
profit efficiency, while higher inflation erodes both.  GDP growth influences profit, 
but not cost, efficiency, while market concentration influences cost, but not profit, 
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efficiency. The impact of property rights protection is positive on cost but negative on 
profit efficiency. Finally, access to banking services has a statistically significant (but 
very marginal) effect on cost, but not profit, efficiency.    
Whilst providing comprehensive cross-country evidence on the impact of 
regulatory and environmental factors on bank efficiency, it seems appropriate to 
conclude by addressing some of the data-related issues that have constrained the 
scope of this study. First, since the World Bank (WB) database on bank regulations 
(Barth et al., 2001a, 2004b) is available for only two points in time, we have assumed 
that regulatory policies within each country remained constant over the time period of 
our analysis. This, however, does not seem unreasonable, since Barth et al. (2004a) 
point out that such regulations change very little over time and control of these 
influences in their study did not alter their findings.27  Second, in obtaining efficiency 
scores we used general proxies for input prices, as missing values for the number of 
employees precluded calculation of an accurate measure of cost per employee. 
Furthermore, in the absence of detailed information on expenditures relating to 
depreciation, we used non-interest expenses (net of personnel expenses) in calculating 
the cost of physical capital. A further criticism highlighted by Berger and Mester 
(2003) and Bos and Kool (2006) is that exogenous rather than endogenous prices (i.e. 
calculated from own accounts) should be used. However, exogenous prices were not 
available in our case, and therefore we had to rely on prices calculated from banks 
own accounts. Nevertheless, our approach to estimating efficiency scores is consistent 
with a majority of previous studies (e.g. Altunbas et al., 2000, 2001; Maudos et al., 
2002; Weill, 2004; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2006) and we believe that, despite these 
data based limitations, our study represents an advance on the existing literature 
                                                 
27 Consequently, other studies using this database (e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache 2002; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Buch and DeLong, 2004a,b; Fernandez and 
Gonzalez, 2005; Beck et al., 2006a), have implicitly made the same assumption. 
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advance in uncovering international evidence suggesting an association between the 
regulatory environment and bank efficiency. 
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                     Table 1: Mean of variables used in Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
 
 TC PBT Q1 Q2 Q3 P1 P2 P3 
Panel A: Sample means by year  
2000 873.074 118.615 8,381.672 6,613.135 13,152.846 0.054 0.998 0.018
2001 809.363 83.396 8,176.305 6,606.077 13,077.034 0.050 1.021 0.017
2002 734.972 95.210 8,783.130 6,975.897 13,799.882 0.047 1.133 0.017
2003 748.285 139.979 10,322.076 8,662.502 16,532.132 0.038 1.214 0.016
2004 761.867 173.618 11,495.451 9,835.891 18,294.350 0.035 1.308 0.015
Panel B: Sample means by geographical region 
Africa & Middle East 163.619 49.453 1,592.864 1,382.395 2,744.158 0.049 0.861 0.015
Asia Pacific 392.060 77.288 9,885.413 5,365.697 14,315.382 0.032 0.637 0.010
Australia 2,569.739 773.507 37,049.115 8,974.930 37,235.083 0.046 3.817 0.008
Eastern Europe 79.724 19.264 516.102 461.126 871.469 0.049 0.743 0.022
Lat America & Carrib 282.308 44.403 1,577.219 1,515.927 2,714.908 0.077 1.246 0.031
North America 2,775.936 512.131 26,212.362 18930.098 41,758.425 0.027 1.910 0.016
Western Europe 2,044.246 242.530 19,536.757 21,593.398 34,087.559 0.040 1.903 0.015
Total sample average 783.620 123.004 9,478.266 7,786.108 15,048.130 0.045 1.140 0.016
Notes: TC: Total Cost, PBT: Profits before taxes; Q1: Loans, Q2: Other earning assets, Q3: Deposits; P1: Interest expenses/Deposits, 
P2: Other overhead expenses/Fixed assets, P3: Personnel expenses/total assets; TC, PBT, Q1, Q2, Q3 are in $ millions expressed in real 
1995 terms; In assigning countries in regions we follow the classification of Global Market Information Database (GMID) of Euromonitor 
International.  
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        Table 2: Observations by year and geographical region 
 
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Africa & Middle East 95 101 106 109 106 517 
Asia Pacific 181 197 199 211 214 1,002 
Australia 9 9 9 9 9 45 
Eastern Europe 55 57 63 66 62 303 
Latin America & Caribbean 85 83 85 84 95 432 
North America 17 18 19 21 21 96 
Western Europe 133 137 140 141 140 691 
Total 575 602 621 641 647 3,086 
Note: In assigning countries in regions we follow the classification of Global Market 
Information Database (GMID) of Euromonitor International 
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Table 3: Sample means of independent variables* 
 
 Africa & Middle 
East 
Asia Pacific Australia Eastern 
Europe 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Total 
Number of bank observations 517 1,002 45 303 432 96 691 3,086 
Number of countries 23 14 1 14 15 2 19 88 
CAPRQ 6.4197 5.5212 7.0000 5.2541 5.4375 4.0625 5.9667 5.7103 
PRMONIT 7.4004 7.5544 8.0000 7.1155 7.1644 7.4688 7.4443 7.4096 
OFPR 8.6230 8.9912 8.0000 7.8977 7.8109 7.1250 5.9334 7.8643 
ACTRS 2.5048 2.7740 2.7500 2.2170 2.7471 2.2813 2.1378 2.5123 
DEPINS** 249 842 45 176 242 96 528 2178 
SIZE 3.0032 3.6495 4.3517 2.3088 2.6336 3.8168 3.5990 3.2715 
EQAS 0.1083 0.0704 0.0688 0.1453 0.1269 0.0808 0.0954 0.0979 
INF 4.2018 2.1226 3.3940 6.5025 10.5950 2.4685 3.5280 4.4310 
GDPGR 5.0716 3.9521 3.2400 4.7099 2.9657 2.7563 2.2454 3.6462 
MACGDP 0.7794 0.6030 1.0464 0.1678 0.2798 1.1854 0.7046 0.5946 
ASSGDP 0.2212 0.2454 0.0797 0.1225 0.0472 0.1302 0.5797 0.2737 
CLAIMS 0.4681 0.7391 0.9327 0.3056 0.2420 0.5577 1.1238 0.6642 
GOVERN 16.1829 22.9417 0.0000 12.0947 13.3284 0.0000 9.6867 15.4736 
FOREIGN 28.9724 15.0973 17.0000 64.9881 28.1187 12.3438 8.2068 22.9962 
CONC 0.6497 0.4398 0.6399 0.5964 0.5466 0.3979 0.6666 0.5575 
GOVINT 3.7327 2.4104 2.0000 2.7295 2.9028 2.1875 2.8466 2.8141 
PRIGHT 3.3228 3.6056 5.0000 2.6199 2.7847 5.0000 4.5137 3.6183 
BRAKM 28.2294 30.8635 0.7731 12.5345 4.2154 5.9428 71.0701 33.2955 
ATMKM 55.2819 262.1683 1.6616 23.6609 8.3641 22.5915 98.4612 116.6114 
Notes: *Sample means for country-specific variables have been calculated on the basis of bank observations (e.g. N = 3,086) and not country observations (e.g. N =88). In some 
cases, the sample number is lower than the one mentioned in the second line due to missing values; **In the case of DEPINS the figure corresponds to the number of observations 
 (i.e. banks) operating under an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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      Table 4: Parameters of the SFA functions estimated on the full sample 
 
  Cost efficiency Profit Efficiency 
 Parameter coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
 β0 1.339 37.651 14.309 196.776 
ln(Q1) β1 0.058 2.899 0.340 7.079 
ln(Q2) β2 0.268 16.583 0.214 5.941 
ln(Q3) β3 0.555 20.319 -0.575 -8.279 
ln (P1/P3) β4 0.289 26.776 0.0586 2.101 
ln (P2/P3) β5 0.162 12.514 -0.064 -2.337 
(lnQ1) 2 / 2 β6 0.001 0.087 0.050 2.544 
ln (Q1)x ln(Q2) β7 -0.011 -1.725 0.039 2.960 
ln (Q1) x ln(Q3) β8 0.001 0.091 -0.094 -3.624 
(lnQ2) 2 / 2 β9 0.095 20.410 0.014 1.376 
ln (Q2) x ln(Q3) β10 -0.096 -14.005 -0.048 -3.099 
(lnQ3) 2 / 2 β11 0.125 8.308 0.149 4.389 
(ln(P1/P3))2 /2 β12 0.171 77.437 -0.020 -3.323 
ln(P1/P3) x ln(P2/P3) β13 -0.003 -1.609 -0.019 -3.440 
(ln(P2/P3))2 / 2 β14 -0.021 -6.748 0.014 1.999 
ln (Q1) x ln(P1/P3) β15 -0.072 -14.625 -0.021 -2.125 
ln (Q1) ln (P2/P3) β16 0.048 9.334 -0.065 -5.246 
ln (Q2) ln (P1/P3) β17 -0.035 -9.313 -0.026 -3.221 
ln (Q2) ln (P2/P3) β18 0.012 3.156 -0.054 -5.670 
ln (Q3) ln (P1/P3) β19 0.109 17.707 0.047 3.409 
ln (Q3) ln (P2/P3) β20 -0.056 -7.515 0.113 5.944 
 σ2 0.248 9.434 0.077 26.752 
 γ 0.983 477.648 0.298 9.401 
 µ -0.988 -9.034 -0.302 -9.890 
 η -0.017 -3.756 0.150 5.330 
Notes: Q1: Loans, Q2: Other earning assets, Q3: Deposits; P1: Interest expenses/Deposits, 
P2: Other overhead expenses/Fixed assets, P3: Personnel expenses/total assets; σ2=σV2+σU2, 
γ=σU2/(σV2+σU2), µ is the transaction of a normal density function, η indicates the time-
variance of inefficiency.  
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            Table 5: Cost and Profit efficiency estimates 
 
  Cost Efficiency 
(CEF) 
Profit Efficiency 
(PEF) 
Panel A: Mean by year  
2000 0.8568 0.9235 
2001 0.8540 0.9320 
2002 0.8493 0.9405 
2003 0.8457 0.9481 
2004 0.8448 0.9548 
Panel B: Mean by region  
Africa & Middle East 0.8706 0.9406 
Asia Pacific 0.8421 0.9410 
Australia 0.8894 0.9495 
Eastern Europe 0.8068 0.9417 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.7855 0.9411 
North America 0.9329 0.9378 
Western Europe 0.8910 0.9373 
Overall mean (N = 3,086) 0.8499 0.9402 
Note: The means by year and region are calculated from the total sample, and do 
not correspond to cross-section or region specific estimates.  
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Table 6: Regulations and cost and profit efficiency (controlling for bank size and 
capitalization) – Tobit regression results  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable – CEF     
SIZE 0.0071*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0127*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0046** 
(0.0297) 
4.80E-05 
(0.9806) 
0.0048** 
(0.0181) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0000) 
EQAS -0.2885*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2803*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2910*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3540*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2968*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2977*** 
(0.0000) 
CAPRQ 0.0095*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- --- 0.0066*** 
(0.0000) 
PRMONIT --- -0.0252*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- -0.0207*** 
(0.0000) 
OFPR --- --- -0.0088*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- -0.0072*** 
(0.0000) 
ACTRS --- --- --- -0.0366*** 
(0.0000) 
--- -0.0301*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS --- --- --- --- 0.0029 
(0.4622) 
0.0072* 
(0.0983) 
Constant 0.8088*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0298*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9412*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9842*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8694*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0992*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Dependent variable- PEF     
SIZE 0.0002 
(0.6629) 
0.0002 
(0.6656) 
0.0002 
(0.5113) 
0.0000 
(0.9720) 
0.0003 
(0.4416) 
-7.79E-05 
(0.8365) 
EQAS -0.0113* 
(0.0657) 
-0.0113* 
(0.0656) 
-0.0107* 
(0.0930) 
-0.0154** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0112* 
(0.0663) 
-0.0150** 
(0.0191) 
CAPRQ -1.46E-05 
(0.9397) 
---- ---- ---- ---- 4.05E-05 
(0.8418) 
PRMONIT ---- -4.83E-07 
(0.9989) 
---- ---- ---- 0.0001 
(0.7243) 
OFPR ---- ---- -0.0001 
(0.3627) 
---- ---- -8.08E-06 
(0.9612) 
ACTRS ---- ---- ---- -0.0020*** 
(0.0002) 
---- -0.0022*** 
(0.0001) 
DEPINS ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.0003 
(0.6233) 
0.0001 
(0.8295) 
Constant 0.9428*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9427*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9435*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9488*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9426*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9480*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs. 3,072 3,072 2,974 3,082 3,082 2,974 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level,  **Statistically significant at the 5% level,  *Statistically significant at the 
10% level;  p-values in parentheses; CEF: cost efficiency, PEF: Profit efficiency; Independent variables are defined 
in Appendix A; QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for 
heteroscedacity. 
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Table 7: Regulations and cost and profit efficiency (controlling for bank 
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions) – Tobit regression results  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable – CEF  
SIZE 0.0003 
(0.8891) 
0.0064*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0014 
(0.4956) 
-0.0058*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0014 
(0.5069) 
0.0023 
(0.2893) 
EQAS -0.2679*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2622*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2694*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3371*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2794*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2697*** 
(0.0000) 
GDPGR -0.0012** 
(0.0472) 
-0.0009 
(0.1623) 
-3.40E-05 
(0.9565) 
-0.0004 
(0.4541) 
-0.0006 
(0.3624) 
-0.0009 
(0.1606) 
INF -0.0029*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0027*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0000) 
CAPRQ 0.0113*** 
(0.0000) 
---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0087*** 
(0.0000) 
PRMONIT ---- -0.0267*** 
(0.0000) 
---- ---- ---- -0.0200*** 
(0.0000) 
OFPR ---- ---- -0.0087*** 
(0.0000) 
---- ---- -0.0074*** 
(0.0000) 
ACTRS ---- ---- ---- -0.0356*** 
(0.0000) 
---- -0.0279*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0037 
(0.3366) 
0.0071* 
(0.0925) 
Constant 0.8355*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0749*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9707*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0118*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9007*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1131*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Dependent variable- PEF     
SIZE 0.0001 
(0.7015) 
0.0001 
(0.7099) 
0.0002 
(0.6392) 
1.94E-05 
(0.9569) 
0.0003 
(0.4753) 
-0.0001 
(0.7253) 
EQAS -0.0108* 
(0.0751) 
-0.0107* 
(0.0770) 
-0.0100 
(0.1120) 
-0.0148** 
(0.0155) 
-0.0104* 
(0.0849) 
-0.0141** 
(0.0256) 
GDPGR 0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
INF -0.0001*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0001) 
CAPRQ -9.43E-05 
(0.6221) 
---- ---- ---- ---- 2.28E-05 
(0.9100) 
PRMONIT ---- 5.46E-05 
(0.8776) 
---- ---- ---- 0.0002 
(0.5202) 
OFPR ---- ---- -0.0002 
(0.1563) 
---- ---- -0.0001 
(0.5389) 
ACTRS ---- ---- ---- -0.0020*** 
(0.0002) 
---- -0.0020*** 
(0.0003) 
DEPINS ---- ---- ---- ---- -5.24E-05 
(0.9293) 
0.0003 
(0.6966) 
Constant 0.9418*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9408*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9430*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9470*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9408*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9464*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs. 3,072 3,072 2,974 3,082 3,082 2,974 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level,  **Statistically significant at the 5% level,  *Statistically significant 
at the 10% level; p-values in parentheses; CEF: cost efficiency, PEF: Profit efficiency; Independent variables are 
defined in Appendix A; QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for 
heteroscedacity. 
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Table 8: Regulations and cost and profit efficiency (controlling for bank 
characteristics and financial sector development) – Tobit regression results  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable- CEF   
SIZE -0.0116*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0172*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0135*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0109*** 
(0.0000) 
EQAS -0.2139*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2277*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1940*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.2769*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2254*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2365*** 
(0.0000) 
MACGDP 0.0106*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0081*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0124*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0099*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0113*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0094*** 
(0.0000) 
ASSGDP -0.0016 
(0.4111) 
-0.0003 
(0.8629) 
0.0000 
(0.9961) 
-0.0094*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0038 
(0.1439) 
-0.0073** 
(0.0360) 
CLAIMS 0.0757*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0805*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0752*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0792*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0832*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0804*** 
(0.0000) 
CAPRQ 0.0049*** 
(0.0002) 
---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0017 
(0.1829) 
PRMONIT ---- 
 
-0.0189*** 
(0.0000) 
---- ---- ---- -0.0147*** 
(0.0000) 
OFPR ---- 
 
---- -0.0070*** 
(0.0000) 
---- ---- -0.0049*** 
(0.0000) 
ACTRS ---- 
 
---- ---- -0.0405*** 
(0.0000) 
---- -0.0336*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS ---- 
 
---- ---- ---- -0.0160*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0092** 
(0.0297) 
Constant 0.8291*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9886*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9078*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9806*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8702*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0807*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Dependent variable- PEF     
SIZE -0.0001 
(0.7415) 
-0.0002 
(0.5597) 
-0.0002 
(0.6469) 
-0.0003 
(0.3997) 
-0.0002 
(0.6744) 
-0.0005 
(0.2849) 
EQAS -0.0102 
(0.1251) 
-0.0104 
(0.1164) 
-0.0113 
(0.1031) 
-0.0137** 
(0.0465) 
-0.0103 
(0.1194) 
-0.0144** 
(0.0421) 
MACGDP 0.0014*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0000) 
ASSGDP 0.0006 
(0.3300) 
0.0006 
(0.3522) 
0.0007 
(0.2759) 
0.0002 
(0.7246) 
0.0006 
(0.3578) 
0.0002 
(0.7344) 
CLAIMS -0.0004 
(0.5826) 
-0.0004 
(0.6209) 
-0.0006 
(0.4928) 
-0.0004 
(0.6169) 
-0.0004 
(0.6616) 
-0.0006 
(0.4783) 
CAPRQ 8.58E-05 
(0.6799) 
---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0002 
(0.4786) 
PRMONIT ---- 0.0003 
(0.5340) 
---- ---- ---- 0.0006 
(0.2280) 
OFPR ---- ---- 
 
-0.0002 
(0.2569) 
---- ---- -9.88E-05 
(0.5690) 
ACTRS ---- ---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0033) 
---- -0.0019*** 
(0.0028) 
DEPINS ---- ---- 
 
---- 
 
---- -0.0001 
(0.8564) 
0.0002 
(0.7584) 
Constant 0.9425*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9411*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9448*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9485 
(0.0000) 
0.9431*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9445*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs 2,760 2,760 2,676 2,760 2,760 2,676 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **Statistically significant at the 5% level, *Statistically significant 
at the 10% level; p-values in parentheses; CEF: cost efficiency, PEF: Profit efficiency; Independent variables 
are defined in Appendix A; QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to 
control for heteroscedacity. 
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Table 9: Regulations and cost and profit efficiency (controlling for bank 
characteristics and market structure) – Tobit regression results 
  
Panel A: Dependent variable- CEF     
SIZE 0.0096*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0132*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0063*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0028 
(0.1949) 
0.0082*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0077*** 
(0.0007) 
EQAS -0.2882*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2939*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3109*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3375*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2932*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3335*** 
(0.0000) 
GOVERN 0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
FOREIGN -0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
CONC 0.1453*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1506*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1485*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1376*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1558*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1261*** 
(0.0000) 
CAPRQ 0.0071*** 
(0.0000) 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
0.0030** 
(0.0249) 
PRMONIT ---- 
 
-0.0221*** 
(0.0000) 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0175*** 
(0.0000) 
OFPR ---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0024) 
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0017 
(0.1012) 
ACTRS ---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0370*** 
(0.0000) 
---- 
 
-0.0319*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS ---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0006 
(0.8901) 
-0.0024 
(0.5934) 
Constant 0.7324*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9259*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8095*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8996*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7740*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0060*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Dependent variable- PEF     
SIZE 3.91E-06 
(0.9916) 
-5.43E-05 
(0.8863) 
-7.83E-05 
(0.8339) 
-0.0003 
(0.4558) 
-9.78E-05 
(0.7904) 
-0.0001 
(0.7906) 
EQAS -0.0144** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0148** 
(0.0137) 
-0.0149** 
(0.0151) 
-0.0171*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0152** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0165*** 
(0.0093) 
GOVERN -4.01E-05*** 
(0.0052) 
-3.59E-05** 
(0.0129) 
-3.69E-05** 
(0.0152) 
-3.01E-05** 
(0.0362) 
-3.61E-05** 
(0.0120) 
-4.02E-05** 
(0.0157) 
FOREIGN 2.34E-05** 
(0.0285) 
1.85E-05* 
(0.0760) 
1.66E-05 
(0.1150) 
1.51E-05 
(0.1460) 
1.59E-05 
(0.1305) 
1.75E-05 
(0.1178) 
CONC -0.0015 
(0.3861) 
-0.0009 
(0.5810) 
0.0002 
(0.8910) 
-0.0014 
(0.4153) 
-0.0009 
(0.5814) 
-0.0009 
(0.6360) 
CAPRQ 0.0005** 
(0.0256) 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
0.0004* 
(0.0842) 
PRMONIT ---- 
 
-0.0002 
(0.5826) 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0001 
(0.7620) 
OFPR ---- ---- 
 
0.0002 
(0.3001) 
---- 
 
---- 
 
0.0002 
(0.2711) 
ACTRS ---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0012** 
(0.0458) 
---- 
 
-0.0013** 
(0.0367) 
DEPINS ---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.0006 
(0.3540) 
-9.04E-05 
(0.8951) 
Constant 0.9414*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9456*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9420*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9482*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9447*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9449*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs 2,948 2,948 2,859 2,948 2,948 2,859 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **Statistically significant at the 5% level, *Statistically significant at the 10% level; 
p-values in parentheses; CEF: cost efficiency, PEF: Profit efficiency; Independent variables are defined in Appendix A; QML 
(Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity. 
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Table 10: Regulations and cost and profit efficiency (controlling for bank 
characteristics and institutional development) – Tobit regression results  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable- CEF  
SIZE -0.0066*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0024 
(0.2181) 
-0.0067*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0090*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0070*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0036* 
(0.0789) 
EQAS -0.3825*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3583*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3597*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4089*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3870*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3508*** 
(0.0000) 
PRIGHT 0.0342*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0363*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0347*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0328*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0346*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0377*** 
(0.0000) 
GOVINT 0.0346*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0324*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0343*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0338*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0354*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0286*** 
(0.0000) 
CAPRQ 0.0026** 
(0.0201) 
--- --- --- --- -0.0007 
(0.5208) 
PRMONIT --- -0.0206*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- -0.0255*** 
(0.0000) 
OFPR --- --- -0.0052*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- -0.0039*** 
(0.0000) 
ACTRS --- --- --- -0.0187*** 
(0.0000) 
--- -0.0184*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS --- --- --- --- -0.0033 
(0.3412) 
-0.0044 
(0.2198) 
Constant 0.6812*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8307*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7335*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7607*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6966*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9580*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Dependent variable- PEF     
SIZE 0.0015*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0057) 
EQAS -0.0058 
(0.3540) 
-0.0064 
(0.3056) 
-0.0068 
(0.2920) 
-0.0112* 
(0.0721) 
-0.0050 
(0.4287) 
-0.0117* 
(0.0682) 
PRIGHT -0.0023*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0029*** 
(0.0000) 
GOVINT 1.42E-05 
(0.9643) 
0.0001 
(0.7448) 
5.45E-05 
(0.8549) 
-0.0001 
(0.6969) 
0.0001 
(0.6436) 
3.04E-05 
(0.9236) 
CAPRQ 6.03E-05 
(0.7644) 
--- --- --- --- 0.0004* 
(0.0790) 
PRMONIT --- 0.0004 
(0.3447) 
--- --- --- 0.0011*** 
(0.0086) 
OFPR --- --- -0.0003* 
(0.0599) 
--- --- -0.0002 
(0.3162) 
ACTRS --- --- --- -0.0028*** 
(0.0000) 
--- -0.0029*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS --- --- --- --- 0.0010* 
(0.0924) 
0.0017** 
(0.0132) 
Constant 0.9458*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9437*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9490*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9559*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9451*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9474*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs 3,046 3,046 2,948 3,056 3,056 2,948 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **Statistically significant at the 5% level, *Statistically significant at 
the 10% level; p-values in parentheses; CEF: cost efficiency, PEF: Profit efficiency; Independent variables are 
defined in Appendix A; QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for 
heteroscedacity. 
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Table 11: Regulations and cost and profit efficiency (controlling for bank 
characteristics and access to banking services) – Tobit regression results  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable- CEF     
SIZE 0.0038* 
(0.0934) 
0.0073*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0014 
(0.5466) 
-0.0030 
(0.1791) 
0.0018 
(0.4072) 
0.0010 
(0.6856) 
EQAS -0.3303*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3591*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3257*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3770*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3451*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3330*** 
(0.0000) 
ATMKM -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-8.57E-05*** 
(0.0000) 
-6.97E-05*** 
(0.0000) 
-7.25E-05*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.05E-06 
(0.9113) 
BRAKM 0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
CAPRQ 0.0050*** 
(0.0002) 
--- --- --- --- 0.0033*** 
(0.0073) 
PRMONIT --- -0.0252*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- --- -0.0239*** 
(0.0000) 
OFFPR --- --- -0.0061*** 
(0.0000) 
--- --- -0.0071*** 
(0.0000) 
ACTRS --- --- --- -0.0377*** 
(0.0000) 
--- -0.0323*** 
(0.0000) 
DEPINS --- --- --- --- 0.0252*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0226*** 
(0.0000) 
Constant 0.8399*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0460*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9216*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9877*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8573*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1505*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Dependent variable- PEF     
SIZE 3.19E-05 
(0.9392) 
3.87E-05 
(0.9264) 
-8.56E-05 
(0.8402) 
-0.0001 
(0.7620) 
0.0002 
(0.6917) 
-0.0004 
(0.3425) 
EQAS -0.0102 
(0.1536) 
-0.0104 
(0.1436) 
-0.0110 
(0.1336) 
-0.0132* 
(0.0706) 
-0.0101 
(0.1561) 
-0.0140* 
(0.0667) 
ATMKM 6.86E-07 
(0.7809) 
7.09E-07 
(0.7805) 
2.12E-06 
(0.4201) 
2.12E-06 
(0.3932) 
2.21E-07 
(0.9296) 
3.79E-06 
(0.2041) 
BRAKM 1.22E-06 
(0.8841) 
1.30E-06 
(0.8772) 
-2.24E-06 
(0.7920) 
-3.85E-06 
(0.6390) 
1.67E-06 
(0.8393) 
-7.02E-06 
(0.4694) 
CAPRQ 6.38E-05 
(0.7721) 
--- --- --- --- 7.41E-05 
(0.7430) 
PRMONIT --- -0.0001 
(0.8451) 
--- --- --- 0.0002 
(0.7799) 
OFFPR --- --- -0.0002 
(0.2981) 
--- --- -0.0001 
(0.5123) 
ACTRS --- --- --- -0.0018*** 
(0.0051) 
--- -0.0023*** 
(0.0010) 
DEPINS --- 
 
--- --- --- -2.54E-05 
(0.9721) 
0.0003 
(0.7548) 
Constant 0.9424*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9436*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9447*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9482*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9424*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9492*** 
(0.0000) 
No. of obs 2,450 2,450 2,366 2,460 2,460 2,366 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **Statistically significant at the 5% level, *Statistically significant at the 10% 
level; p-values in parentheses; CEF: cost efficiency, PEF: Profit efficiency; Independent variables are defined in Appendix 
A; QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity. 
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Appendix A- Information on independent variables 
 
Variable Category Description Source/Database 
Regulatory variables    
CAPRQ Capital  
requirements 
This variable takes values between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating grater stringency. It is determined by 
adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-7 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the case of questions 8 
and 9 (i.e. yes=0, no =1). (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with individual bank’s credit risk? (3) Does the ratio vary with market risk? 
(4-6) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value 
of capital:  (a) market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) unrealized losses in securities 
portfolios? (c) unrealized foreign exchange losses? (7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by 
the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (8) Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets 
other than cash or government securities? (9) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds?  
WB (Barth et al., 
2004b) 
PRMONIT Private 
monitoring 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating policies that promote private 
monitoring. It is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following ten 
questions: (1) Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement while loan is non-
performing? (2) Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any 
non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (4) Are off-balance 
sheet items disclosed to public? (5) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to public? (6) Are 
directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (7) Is an external audit compulsory? (8) Are there 
specific requirements for the extent of audit? (9) Are auditors licensed or certified? (10) Do regulations require 
credit ratings for commercial banks?  
WB (Barth et al., 
2004b) 
OFPR Official 
disciplinary 
power 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating higher power of the supervisory 
authorities. It is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following ten 
questions: (1) Can the supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (2) Are 
there any mechanisms of cease-desist type orders whose infraction leads to automatic imposition of civil & penal 
sanctions on banks directors & managers? (3) Can the supervisory agency order directors/management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual/potential losses? (4) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision 
to distribute dividends? (5) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute bonuses? (6) Can 
the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute management fees? (7) Can the supervisory 
agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare bank insolvent? (8) Does banking law allow supervisory 
agency to suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? (9) Regarding bank restructuring & 
reorganization, can supervisory agency remove and replace management? (10) Regarding bank restructuring & 
reorganization, can supervisory agency remove and replace directors? 
 
ACTRS Restrictions on The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank WB (Barth et al., 
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banks activities participation in: (1) securities activities (2) insurance activities (3) real estate activities (4) bank ownership of 
non-financial firms. These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited that are assigned the 
values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We use an overall index by calculating the average value over the four 
categories. Obviously, a higher value indicates greater restrictiveness. 
2004b) 
DEPINS Deposit insurance 
scheme 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is an explicit deposit insurance scheme and zero otherwise.  WB (Barth et al., 
2004b) 
Control variables    
Bank-specific   
SIZE                               Bank size   Logarithm of total assets  
EQAS                             Bank capitalization   Equity / total assets  
Macroeconomic conditions   
GDPGR Overall economic 
conditions 
Real GDP growth  GMID 
INF Inflation Annual rate of Inflation GMID  
Financial development   
ASSGDP Size of the 
banking system 
Assets of deposit money banks/ GDP GMID 
CLAIMS Activity in the 
banking sector 
Bank claims to the private sector / GDP GMID 
MACGDP Size of the stock 
market 
Stock market capitalization / GDP GMID 
Market structure   
FOREIGN Presence of 
foreign banks 
Fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more foreign-owned WB (Barth et al., 
2004b) 
GOVERN Presence of 
government-
owned banks 
Fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more foreign-owned WB (Barth et al., 
2004b) 
CONC Concentration Percentage of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in the country WB (Beck et al., 
2006b) 
Institutional environment   
PRIGHT Property rights This is an index of property rights that indicates the degree to which a country’s laws protect property rights and 
the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will 
be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and business to 
enforce contracts. The index takes values between 1 and 5, with higher values indicating higher property rights 
protection. (See note below).  
Heritage 
Foundation 
  55 
GOVINT Government 
intervention in 
the economy 
This is an index of government intervention in the economy. It measures government’s direct use of scarce 
resources for its own purposes and government’s control over resources through ownership. The index takes 
values between 1 and 5, with higher values indicating higher levels of government consumption in the economy 
and higher share of revenues received from state-owned enterprises and property.   
Heritage 
Foundation 
Access to banking services   
BRAKM Extent of branch network     Number of branches per 1,000 sq km WB (Beck et al., 
2005). 
ATMKM Extent of ATMs             Number of ATMs per 1,000 sq km WB (Beck et al., 
2005). 
Notes: WB: World Bank; GMID:  Global Market Information Database of Euromonitor International; In its original form, as published by the Heritage Foundation, higher values for 
the property rights index indicate lower protection of private property. Hence, a score of 5 would imply very low protection whereas a score of 1 would indicate very high protection. 
For the purposes of the present study, for easiness of interpretation, we have reversed this scale. Thus, we replaced original values of 5 with 1 and visa versa, as well as original values 
of 4 with 2 and visa versa. Obviously, values of 3 have remained unchanged. Consequently, in our case higher values indicate more protection. 
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